[Montréal, Québec, Canada 20°C] In a previous post, I write about returning to Southern Sudan, how my first visit only increased my appetite for more. How little I knew about the place then and how much more I want to know about it now. The upcoming all-Sudan general elections that everyone-following-Sudan is talking about, would be the perfect opportunity to return.
These elections are a cornerstone of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army. Another is the Southern self-determination referendum, scheduled for 2011 at the end of the peace deal’s six-year interim period. Both are absolutely dependent on the results of Sudan’s 2008 National Census.
On June 28, 2009, Eric Reeves published General Elections and Southern Self-Determination: At Growing Risk about the serious challenges facing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Sudan’s ability/desire to hold fair and democratic elections. According to Reeves’ website, he “has spent the past ten years working full-time as a Sudan researcher and analyst, publishing extensively both in the US and internationally.” Even before starting his article, he begins with the statement:
“Increasingly pessimistic assessments of Sudan’s scheduled national elections (February 2010) [recently postponed until April 2010] make clear that the 2011 Self-Determination Referendum is deeply endangered. If the referendum is aborted, or occurs amidst the grim environment in prospect, it will re-ignite country-wide war.”
The paper is divided into sections that detail the various components that effectively compromise the election/referendum process in Sudan: 1) Sudan’s national census; 2) Logistical, technical, and administrative obstacles; 3) Censorship; 4) Khartoum’s efforts to destabilize the south; 4) Elections in Darfur; and 5) US policy towards Khartoum and the elections.
Near the former Abyei Market after May 2008 Crisis that saw heavy fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army and displaced up to 100,000 people.
The contested results of Sudan’s 2008 national census, which is the critical first step in determining electoral boundaries and demographic details for resource distribution, have—according to Reeves—”serious anomalies that deserve attention.” The Director of the Census Commission, Awad Haj Ali, has suggested that displaced Southern Sudanese living in the north have been under-counted to 500,000 but may be as many as 1.5 million people. Considering the estimates of four to five million southerners displaced to the north during the war and a May 27 report by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center that 2.24 million IDP’s have returned to the South, there could even more southerners uncounted in the census. The government of Sudan’s insistence that the census form not ask the questions of place of birth or origin may have influenced the results.
Other issues include the results for Darfur, which did not include the the internally displaced people in their camps. The increase by 332% in the population of migratory Arab groups in Darfur—who would presumably vote for Sudan’s governing National Islamic Front/National Congress Party (NIF/NCP)— is, according to Government of South Sudan Minister of Presidential Affairs, “the strangest thing” in the results for Darfur that Reeves states is “the most conspicuous anomaly.”
The implications for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Southern representation loosing millions of votes in the upcoming elections, could reduce representation of the SPLM in the National Assembly to something approximating 21% that the census classifies as “Southern.” With a percentage below 25 in Sudan’s National Assembly, Southern representatives would no longer have the ability to reject constitutional amendments, which may allow the governing NIF/NCP to use legislative majority to “revoke key elements of the CPA, including the right to self-determination, or to extort an unacceptably high price for it.”
Reeves’ 14-page report reveals the fragility of the peace in Sudan as indicated no only in its first paragraph cited above but also in its last sentence, “On present course, both elections and peace in Sudan are doomed.” I hope for the people in Southern Sudan who I met and who are hoping for a solidified peace to settle in their country that the “growing risk” will be averted.
Interesting article:
- Sudanese Return to be Counted (BBC, April 2008)
SPLM is testing real democracy for that is what formend the gist of their struggle.but surpringly it is laying undemocratic strategy by putting in place SPLM incumbent governors so that they can manipulate the election results. old governors are supposed to resign and be candidates not to combine candidature and state administration this is self contradictory and a denial of true democracy, more so preliminary elections are supposed to be conducted in all the counties to choose party candidates not just select 20 clique of fellows to vote regardless of the millions of people for whom goverment stands and represents, where is their say in sending guys on party tickect for elections. you guys got rid of one dictator only to replace with other.
Yes, Frédéric, it important to understand the representation in Sudan’s complex political landscape.
It took me a while to answer this question because I too did not understand your question and had to do some research to get details. From what I have read lately there is no predetermined quota arrangement within Sudan’s electoral system, with the exception for the representation of women in the various legislatures (more on this below).
If I remember correctly, I mentioned to you that Sudan’s present power sharing system of governance forces the various levels of government to have specific ratios of representation. This representation is an Interim Government structure as stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and becomes the basis of government prior to holding the general elections.
There are four levels of government each with their own jurisdiction: 1) The Government of National Unity (GoNU) that protects and promots the sovereignty of the Sudan, consists of both a National Assembly and a Council of States ; 2) The Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) that exercises authority in Southern Sudan, consists of a Transitional Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly; 3) State government for each State throughout Sudan (north and south); and 4) Local government throughout the Sudan (north and south).
According to the Summary Booklet of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as published by GoSS’ Ministry for Information and Broadcasting, within the Power Sharing Protocol, “the parties agreed to create a decentralized system of governance with significant devolution of powers. In that system, the GoNU will exercise sovereignty over the entire Sudan, but will link to the States of Southern Sudan through the GoSS.”
The GoNU’s National Assembly consists of 52% representation from Sudan’s dominant National Congress Party, 28% from Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, 14% from Other Northern Political Parties, and 6% Other Southern Political Parties. GoNU’s Council of States consists of 46% NCP, 34% SPLM, 12% Other northern parties, and 8% Other southern parties. The Northern Sudan States consist of 70% NCP, 10% SPLM, 20% Other northern parties, and 0% Other southern parties.
The Government of Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly consists of 15% NCP, 70% SPLM, 0% Other Northern parties, and 15% Other southern parties. Southern State governments consist of 10% NCP, 70% SPLM, 0% Other Northern parties and 20% Other southern parties. The special areas of Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei have their own ratios.
As I understand it, these ratios, decided in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement will be overridden by the 2010 election results.
I mentioned earlier that the representation of women is ‘guaranteed’ within the National Elections Act of 2008. The composition of the National Legislature, the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, and State Legislative Assemblies will follow the following ratios to include the participation of women in Sudan’s governance: 60% of the members shall be elected to represent geographical constituencies at their respective levels; 25% of women members shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation from separate and closed party lists; and 15% of members shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation from separate and closed party lists.
So (barring other variables) the electorate will, indeed, see the outcome of their vote reflected in their representatives.
Hi David,
I’m wondering about one thing here. I can’t find information about the Sudan elections’ quota system. I’m wondering what the use of the elections is, if there are already quotas defined for every political party. Isn’t that a waste of resources? If people are to vote, they might want to see the outcome of their vote reflected in their representatives, no?
Keep up the good work!
Frédéric